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Jörg Volbers* 
Language or Experience? – That’s not the Question: A Case for Relexivity
Abstract: Analytic philosophy of language has often criticized classical pragmatism 
for holding to an unwarranted notion of experience which lapses into epistemological 
foundationalism; defenders of the classics have denied such a consequence. The 
paper tries to move this debate forward by pointing out that the criticism of the 
empiricist “given” is not wedded to a speciic philosophical method, be it linguistic 
or pragmatist. From a broader historical perspective drawing in particular on Kant, 
antifoundationalism turns out to be deeply rooted in modern western philosophy 
and its ambivalent attitude towards the success of the empirical sciences. This 
diagnosis allows to reassess classical pragmatism beyond the perceived alternative 
“language vs. experience”, and to concentrate on antifoundationalism as the real 
challenge to any modern, epistemologically oriented philosophy. In that perspective, 
classical pragmatism’s genuine contribution is to do justice to antifoundationalism 
by focusing on the experimental dynamic of scientiic practice, which is most 
commonly ignored by the analytic tradition. Pragmatism identiies rationality with 
the practical operation of relexively determining and articulating what is being 
experienced. With this approach, it is argued, experiential pragmatism serves 
modern antifoundationalism ends better than its analytic siblings.
The Antifoundationalist Challenge 
Any contemporary discussion of pragmatism which turns to it for more than 
historical reasons is faced with a challenge: How should it deal with the troubling 
issue of experience? In the light of the rise and success of analytic philosophy of 
language, the classical pragmatist’s recourse to a rather strong notion of “experience” 
is on the defensive. The classical igures of that tradition, namely Peirce, James and 
Dewey, put a lot of explanatory weight on the fact that human beings are experiencing 
beings. “Experience”, in their view, is not just empirical access to the world granted 
to a being which is, in its essence, rational and linguistic. For them, experience is the 
essential form of human interaction. The experiential “low” (as James tends to see it) 
or “activity” (as Dewey puts it) permeates, and thus forms, the more intellectual and 
cognitive dimensions even where – as in logic – the mind seems to be withdrawn from 
all forms of “empirical” contact. Peirce’s semiotic categories of immediate “irstness”, 
reactive “secondness” and normative “thirdness” and Dewey’s distinction between 
experiences had or known are attempts to capture such a sense of an inescapable direct 
human exposure, dependency and involvement.
From the perspective of analytic linguistic philosophy, though, it is exactly that 
strong notion of experience – the reliance on experience as source, medium and arbiter 
of knowledge – which constitutes its weakest part. They see the pragmatist “quest 
for immediacy” (Bernstein 1966: 92) as a quest to give knowledge a foundation. 
But such a foundation, it is argued, cannot be had; in particular, it cannot be had 
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by reference to “experience”. Such a hope is an empiricist “Myth of the Given”, as 
Sellars (1997) famously put it: an unsupportable fantasy to construe experience as 
an immediate access to the world. Instead, we should accept that any experience or 
experiential content is of necessity linguistically mediated. In the eyes of the analytic 
tradition of linguistic philosophy, we should investigate that intrinsically linguistic 
nature of human understanding, since language – and not experience – is the hallmark 
of human understanding. Consequently, many famous revitalizations of pragmatism 
(Rorty 1979; Brandom 1994) try to separate the tradition from its strong reliance 
on “experience” and prefer to reformulate pragmatist insights with the means of 
linguistic philosophy.
It appears, then, that one must choose between two distinct alternatives: language 
or experience, “linguistic” or “experiential” pragmatism. But the situation is more 
complicated than this. The main motive of those linguistic philosophers who criticize 
the classic pragmatists is to preserve what has been called antifoundationalism. 
Antifoundationalism is the position that there is no privileged, immediate access to 
reality (through, e.g., sense-data or raw experience). It rejects in particular the idea that 
there is a “basic level” of empirical interaction which gives us a glimpse of the world 
as it is, independently of our concepts and expectations. Basically, it is a renunciation 
of a dogmatic, straightforward empiricism. I take contemporary antifoundationalism 
to be the most inluential and the most important argument against a strong notion of 
“experience”.
And yet such an antifoundationalist position is not exclusive to analytic philosophy 
of language. It is also a constitutive feature of pragmatism itself, and it has been 
consciously embraced by the classical authors of that tradition. Thus many defenders 
of classical pragmatism – such as Richard Bernstein (2010) – point out that the attacks 
in the name of antifoundationalism simply miss the target. Viewing our knowledge 
as always fallible, precarious and subject to constant reformulation and revision, 
pragmatism clearly belongs to the list of antifoundationalist thinkers. In fact there can 
be found such a strong antifoundationalism that, as Bernstein (2010: 152) notes, it can 
be seen as a “slander” to accuse the classic pragmatists of the opposite.
This observation shifts the problem. It is not as if the classical pragmatists 
were unaware of the challenge of antifoundationalism and the dangers of dogmatic 
empiricism. The question is whether they succeeded in incorporating that insight into 
their philosophy. For many interpreters, they eventually failed. The most prominent 
example for this assessment is Rorty, who claimed that “‘Language’ is a more suitable 
notion than ‘experience’ for saying the holistic and anti-foundationalist things which 
James and Dewey had wanted to say” (Rorty 1985: 40; 1991: 53). It may have been the 
pragmatists’ intention to avoid the empiricist given, but thinking and working before 
the linguistic turn, they lacked the tools to consequently avoid the mythical given. 
Rorty is here in a rather unusual alliance with Cheryl Misak. She argues in her recent 
book on “American Pragmatism” that pragmatism and logical empiricism “drifted 
closer and closer” to each other, “until the views were almost indistinguishable” 
(Misak 2013: 254). Her book tells the story of a general rise of pragmatist thinking 
in the 20th century which unites pragmatism and analytic antifoundationalist thinkers. 
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Both narratives seem to heed Bernstein’s reminder that antifoundationalism is a 
distinguishing mark of classical pragmatism. But they do not establish a perspective 
in which both sides – linguistic and experiential pragmatism – can be assessed on their 
own merits. They measure the classics against the achievements of modern analytical 
philosophy, and judge them consequently to either be a part of it, or to have tried at 
least to be so. Such approaches abandon the idea that there is any distinctive point in 
classical pragmatism’s insistence on “experience”.
This approach is a signiicant problem not only for those who wish to defend 
that classical orientation. In presupposing the post-analytic take on “experience”, it 
also blocks discussions of possible shortcomings of this view. Moreover, it does not 
allow us to see what is really at issue here, which is the philosophical signiicance 
of antifoundationalism itself. If indeed the suggestion that both the philosophy of 
language and classical pragmatism are antifoundational is correct, we then need to 
ask what the common problem is to which they both respond. Neither tradition is just 
“standing there” in history. Rather, each articulates and answers questions posed by 
the tradition they inherit and the historical space they occupy. 
What are those questions? We will see that antifoundationalism is more than just 
a criticism of certain empiricist aspirations. This concept (and the sort of criticism it 
invites) is actually assimilating a host of problems and topics which are typical for 
modernity, that is, for philosophy since Bacon and Descartes. So the irst necessary 
step is to situate the debates of the 20th century in a wider frame. If we want to look for 
the beginnings of the widespread philosophical criticism of foundationalism, we must 
go back to Kant and his “Copernican revolution”. Kant was trying to save empiricism 
from Hume’s skeptical interpretation, and he became the canonical reference for the 
idea that there is no such thing as an immediate contact with the world – as Kant puts 
it, every experience is the product of the synthesizing activities of the mind. It is no 
surprise, then, that antifoundationalist philosophy of language was repeatedly engaged 
with Kant and the post-Kantian heritage. And it is, of course Hegel, this “great foe of 
immediacy” (Sellars), who is the best known and most discussed antifoundationalist. 
Here we can ind a suitable starting point to develop a broader understanding 
of antifoundationalism. If we see it as a part of Kant’s complicated heritage, we 
are equipped with a point of reference shared by both classical pragmatism and 
contemporary philosophy of language. Kantian philosophy is not only central to the 
tradition of Logical Empiricism, against which post-analytic philosophy of language 
revolted. (Friedman 1999) Authors such as Sellars, McDowell and Brandom also 
articulate their position in close confrontation with Kant and Hegel; there is even talk 
of a “return of Hegelian thought” (Redding 2007; Bernstein 2010: 89-105). 
Pragmatism, in turn, is irmly rooted in American and continental thinking. 
Idealism was one of the dominating schools in British and American philosophy 
towards the end of the 19th century; it left visible traces in the classical pragmatist’s 
writings. Dewey describes his own trajectory as a transition from “absolutism to 
experimentalism”, explicitly expressing his own debts to Hegel’s philosophy; Peirce 
takes his thinking as a critical correction of Hegelian approaches. James entertained 
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a much more ambiguous relationship to idealism’s heritage1. But even his case shows 
that pragmatism and philosophy of language can claim a shared point of departure. 
The point, then, of the following relections is to draw the consequences of that 
common heritage. We should rid antifoundationalism of any constitutive reference 
to a speciic method or medium, be it “language”, “consciousness” or “experience”. 
There are many ways to be an antifoundationalist. We would do better not to take 
antifoundationalism to be a clear-cut doctrine. Rather, it should be seen as tied to a 
speciic modern outlook on thinking and relexivity. Once we have broadened our 
perspective in this way, we will be better able to judge and to discuss the potential 
strengths and weaknesses of experiential pragmatism on its own – as one articulation 
of modern antifoundationalism among others. 
One central aim of this paper is to establish such a perspective. To that end, the 
following text begins (Sec. 2) by expounding what will be called the “received view”. 
According to that view, most prominently defended by Richard Rorty, analytical 
post-empiricist philosophy of language represents antifoundationalism in its best 
and purest form. This position is backed by a historical narrative which depicts 
antifoundationalism as the result of a radical criticism of its empiricist predecessors, 
notably the Logical Empiricism of the Vienna Circle. I will argue that this position is 
historically inaccurate (Sec. 3); there are more ties between post-empiricist linguistic 
philosophy and Logical Empiricism than the received view suggests. Most notably, 
the modern empiricists also shared a general antifoundational perspective on science 
and rationality, a radical “ideal of intellectual lexibility as a mark of science and 
rationality” (Godfrey-Smith 2003: 30). Given these commonalities, I will argue 
(Sec. 4) that antifoundationalism is better seen as a distinctive modern understanding 
of science and rationality, most inluentially defended by Kant and post-Kantian 
philosophies, and thus not speciically tied to philosophy of language. 
From that perspective, then, the conlict between “language and experience” 
appears to be of limited value. The more important subject, it is argued (Sec. 5), is 
how to keep the delicate balance between what will turn out to be the two constitutive 
orientations of antifoundationalism: a general afirmation of science as a commendable 
way to gain knowledge, on the one hand, and an insistence on the standing possibility 
of critical relection. Here it emerges that it is “relexivity” which forms the core of 
modern antifoundationalism.
The remaining sections argue that even though “language vs. experience” is 
the wrong question, the classical pragmatists’ strong notion of “experience” is of 
great value for such an articulation of critical relexivity. Classical pragmatism is a 
reconstruction of experience, and an experientially driven relection on the model of 
the experiment (Sec. 6). It thus articulates an understanding of rationality and criticism 
which keeps distance from a positivist reduction of thinking and yet provides itself 
with the means to learn and proit from the rise of modern science. Central to this 
position, it is argued, is the acceptance of the idea that experience itself drives forward 
1. Cf. Bernstein (2010: 93-95) for a cautious appraisal of James. One of Pierce’s numerous references 
to Hegel is that “in the long wandering of his Encyclopedia he has been a little warmed by truth” (1998: 
143).
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the development of rationality and reason, as it is exempliied in the case of the 
experiment. 
 1. The Received View 
The irst step, then, is to unsettle the conviction that any decent antifoundationalism 
has to take a linguistic form. It is this assumption that puts experiential pragmatism 
and modern analytic philosophy of language at odds with one another. Rorty 
(1979, 1982, and 1991) is probably most responsible for disseminating that view. 
According to his inluential narrative, early analytic philosophy’s turn to language 
(as in the works of Frege) “was a rather desperate attempt to keep philosophy an 
armchair discipline” (Rorty 1991: 50). It tried to create a transcendental refuge from 
the empirical sciences which began, in the 19th  century, to encroach on formerly 
venerable philosophic topics, most notably on the study of the mind. The dialectical 
point here is that in reining that “armchair-philosophy”, more and more problems 
were uncovered. According to the received view, philosophers of language came 
inally (after World  War II) to see that the very idea of separating “experience” from 
linguistic understanding was wrong from the start. Authors like Sellars, Quine and 
Davidson (with the support of pragmatism and the later Wittgenstein) turned away 
from the originally rigid distinction between analytical relection and empirical 
content and established the holistic, antifoundationalist philosophy of language which 
Rorty himself endorsed. Analytic philosophy turned to what has been dubbed “post-
analytic”2 or “post-positivistic” philosophy, an approach which sees no need for a 
philosophical relection on “experience”. 
The received view is, of course, not wrong in any obvious sense. If we want to 
see how it fails, we have to highlight the points that make it so convincing, and then 
try to see them from another perspective. The irst correct historical point to note 
is that the story centers on a problem which is of special interest for us: analytic 
philosophy begins as a problematization of experience. The analytical move towards 
linguistic logic, inaugurated by Frege, was itself a reaction to an overly empiricist 
stance towards thinking. The catchword here is “anti-psychologism”. In Frege’s eyes, 
among others, 19th century positivism went too far. It declared that even the laws of 
thinking were individual and should become an object of empirical psychological 
studies, thus translating John Stuart Mill’s psychologist understanding of logic as 
forms of “mental association” into an empirical research program3. Against this all-
encompassing empiricism, Frege defended a basically Kantian vision of the necessity 
2. The term “post-analytic” wrongly suggests a decisive, revolutionary anti-empiricist turn within 
analytic philosophy. As Michael Beany (2013: 28) points out, this view over-dramatizes the events. I’ll 
stick to the label, though, where it helps to distinguish “analytic philosophy after World War II” from 
the earlier tradition. 
3. “The linguistic turn...became necessary because, in the course of the nineteenth century, evolutionary 
biology and empirical psychology had begun to naturalize the notions of ‘mind’, ‘consciousness’, and 
‘experience’” (Rorty 1991: 53). Ryle (in Ayer 1956: 6) and Beaney (2013: 33-34) point out that authors 
as different as Bradley, Husserl, and Brentano shared analytic philosophy’s critical attitude towards 
psychologism and the naturalization of the mind.
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of objective, a priori rules of logic. Logic cannot be reduced to psychological laws if 
we want to retain the distinction between our objective knowledge of things and mere 
subjective belief. Without the common ground of objectively shared logical laws, 
Frege contends, there could not even be the possibility of a rational dispute (Frege 
1962: xix). In consequence, we must assume the validity of logic over against the 
turmoil of empirical studies. In that way, philosophy of language established a realm 
a priori against which empirical sciences were supposed to have no leverage. 
One founding impulse of analytic philosophy thus was the attempt to establish 
itself against excessive empiricism. Consequently, the task of accounting for our 
experiential contact with the world constituted a permanent challenge for analytical 
thinking4. In admitting to logic this superior, ahistorical role, it became dificult to 
see how to describe the relationship between logical (i.e. inferential or “syntactical”) 
relations and world-disclosing empirical evidence. A parallel problem haunted 
linguistic philosophy in general at this time. In the irst third of the 20th century, 
structuralist theories (i.e. early Wittgenstein, Schlick, Hilbert, de Saussure) were trying 
to explain meaning in purely formal terms, thus repeating the general neo-Kantian 
move towards the a priori. In the course of attempts to clarify the empirical “contact” 
of this formal structure and the world, the domain of the former began to shrink. 
It is one common mark of post-analytic philosophy that it assigns human practice 
a constitutive role for the development, and thus logic, of our understanding. The 
formalist understanding of practice as “mere use” gave way to an acknowledgment of 
the irreducible interdependence of form and praxis (Bertram 2008). Thus, analytical 
empiricism set out on a quest which, as Bernstein nicely summarizes, had “begun with 
an obsession with the meaning and reference of single terms [and then] moved to the 
search for a rigorous criterion for discriminating empirically meaningful sentences or 
propositions, [before it] shifted to the evaluation of competing conceptual schemes, 
and inally turned to the realization that science must be a historically dynamic 
process” (Bernstein 1983: 173). 
What we have here, in fact, is a continuous criticism of experience, which is 
paradigmatically represented within analytic philosophy of language by the works 
of Quine, Sellars and Davidson. They put an end to any philosophical aspirations to 
isolate a distinct logical a priori. Quine destroyed the distinction between analytic and 
synthetic; Davidson the still lingering “very idea of a conceptual scheme”; and Sellars 
joined Quine’s anti-reductionist criticism with his attack on the “Myth of the Given”. 
All of this amounted to a full rejection of empiricism: there are no isolated analytic truths 
which could be irmly set against experience; there is no single, individual evidence 
which can authoritatively conirm or falsify empirical claims; and there is even no 
conceptual “framework” which bestows incommensurable forms on experience. 
Given this development, it is no surprise that Rorty perceived classical 
pragmatism’s strong notion of experience as a hopeless anachronism. Once freed from 
the early analytics’ a priori, language can serve the same philosophical goals as the 
4. Another force driving the transformation of analytic philosophy was the internal criticism to the 
logicist foundationalist program launched by Frege and Russell, which tried to present mathematics as 
a pure articulation of logic. 
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classical notion of experience. And it can even serve them better. Experience seems 
to be leeting and unstable, it is hard to describe, and it is burdened with theoretical 
dificulties about consciousness and mental representation. Conversely, a linguistic 
token is always ready to hand for further inferences. Once we give up the idea that 
linguistic meaning represents some given “inner” intentional states, meaning becomes 
objectively accessible. There might be diverging perspectives, but meaningful 
language – very much like logic in Frege’s sense – always transcends our private 
consciousness. It can be looked at over and over again, and it is thus always at the 
disposal for criticism and relection. 
2. Revising the Received View 
The main problem of the received view is that it tacitly accepts the traditional 
empiricist’s narrow understanding of experience. The narrative is right in stressing that 
empiricism posed one of the major challenges to analytical philosophy, and that this 
constellation contributed to some of its most distinct accomplishments. But it is wrong 
in suggesting that there is an internal relation between “foundationalism” – a dogmatic 
view on thinking, science and critical rationality – and the notion of “experience”. 
It takes experience tout court to be responsible for foundationalism, whereas the real 
historical target had been “experience” as a technical epistemological term. This narrow 
perspective is due to the very same historical dynamics which have just been sketched: 
Logical Empiricism introduced a reduced, purely scientiically oriented understanding 
of “experience” into analytic philosophy; and this limited thematic focus has not been 
widened after Logical Positivism’s fall. In consequence, all those forms of experience 
which were so pivotal for classical pragmatism – artistic experience, ethical feelings, 
or experiences of doubt – were kept out of the discussion. The one-sided empiricist 
understanding of experience came to stand for experience in full5. 
But there is no need to adopt this limited point of view. Support for a wider 
perspective is provided by the historical dimension of the narrative itself. The post-
analytic exclusion of “experience” in favor of “language” has been itself a critical 
response to a speciic historical experience – the rise of positivism and the expansion 
of empirical research to previously undisturbed regions. In that historical perspective, 
we can see that “language” and “experience” are elements of the same relexive 
movement: they are parts of the attempt to come to grips with that newly established 
“empiricity” of the emerging knowledge practices. Even if “language” is the last word 
of such a philosophical relection, it is part of a reasoned recommendation on how we 
should, in the light of these cultural developments, better understand our relation to the 
world and to ourselves. In that perspective, “experience” and “language” denote two 
poles of a relation, and the real question turns out to be how to understand that relation.
5. Even John McDowell, who is consciously defending a “minimal empiricism” (McDowell 1996: xi) 
within the coordinates of an anti-foundationalist philosophy of language, still adheres to the narrow 
empiricist conception which treats experience as something passive (1996: 10). For a criticism of this 
particular point, see Peschard 2010. 
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Taking a second look at the received historical narrative, we can see that such a 
relational view its much better the real historical movements of the analytic debate. The 
primary motive behind empiricism is to explain how our conceptions of the world, our 
understanding, can be corrected by the world itself. Such a conception is not necessarily 
identical with foundationalism. If foundationalism is the idea that such an empirical 
point of contact serves as irrefutable evidence, we can avoid foundationalism by simply 
canceling “irrefutable”. In this loose antifoundationalist sense, then, the contested 
postulate of “epistemic intermediaries” (Davidson 2009a) is better understood as an 
attempt to give an articulated form to the world-dependence of thinking. These attempts 
might be better or worse; but they are not automatically “mythical”.
Remember that analytic philosophy began with Frege’s task of separating logic 
from experience. This move, polemically dismissed as “armchair philosophy” by 
Rorty, can also be understood as an effort to rescue criticism from its positivistic self-
destruction. It is a perfectly valid example of relexively assigning “experience” its 
due place. Positivism documents the problems we run into if we put too much weight 
on the role of experience in our inquiries. If the only valid knowledge is empirical 
knowledge, the very idea of knowledge itself is threatened; we create paradoxes6. The 
knowing subject cannot simply step aside and investigate its own presuppositions 
and cognitive operations. We can’t get out of our skins. Thus, we need a form of 
explanation that allows for the possibility of continuous empirical research without 
letting empiricism run wild. 
This broadly Kantian motive also inspired Logical Empiricism, the direct 
predecessor of “post-analytic” philosophy. Since Rorty, the historiography of this 
earlier analytic philosophy has made considerable advances. Authors like Alan 
Richardson, Thomas Uebel or Michael Friedman paint the picture of a tradition which 
did not seek to found knowledge in experience, at least not in the pejorative sense: 
“it is false that all these philosophies rehash traditional foundationalist epistemology” 
(Uebel 1996: 416)7. The project, rather, is to understand how empirical sciences can 
be so impressively effective, and to defend them as the ultimate model for gaining 
secure knowledge – an ambition incidentally shared by classical pragmatism8. Part of 
that project on the side of Logical Empiricism was to mark the particular (“empirical”) 
points of contact which explain science’s distinct advantage over competing forms of 
inquiry. The intention was not to dogmatically restrict our possibilities of knowledge, 
but rather to allow for the multiplicity of empirical research. The chided “formalism” 
of Logical Empiricism should be seen as an important ingredient of such a lexible 
form of empiricism: By reducing logic to a formal relation without any factual content, 
this philosophy actually tried to consciously avoid the projection of philosophical 
dogmas and unjustiied beliefs into the scientiic system of testing and validation. 
6. These paradoxes, which all result from the attempt to give the operations of the mind a positive 
foundation which is external to the mind itself, are well captured by Foucault, who describes the 
human being as “doubling” itself, or splitting itself into an empirical and a transcendental part (2012: 
Chapter 9).
7. An impressive document of that rehabilitation of Logical Empiricism is Richardson and Uebel 2007. 
8. Cheryl Misak 2013 draws attention to this overlap. 
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There is further reason to resist the dismissal of Logical Positivism, or analytical 
empiricism in general, as a plain foundationalist enterprise. We could call it the 
“argument by tradition”. Many ideas defended by post-analytical authors can be 
also found in the writings of their predecessors – simply because the post-analytical 
arguments critically relect that tradition. They had not been invented from scratch. 
Take holism: Quine was not the irst to introduce holism in philosophy of science. 
Neurath and Carnap well knew that empirical testing is dependent on whole “systems” 
of concepts and theories9. The same holds for the criticism of the analytic-synthetic-
divide. Quine’s radical demand for empirical testability, which he turned against 
analytic sentences, was “a standard Viennese stock in trade, and there were numerous 
variations” (Creath 2007: 340). There’s more Carnap in Quine and Sellars than Rorty’s 
one-sided historiography would allow. 
All of this is not to imply that there had been no progress in the move from 
Logical Empiricism to post-analytical philosophy. The point here is just to insist on 
commonalities that are too often ignored. They show that antifoundationalism is more 
an issue than a well-articulated position. There is even an emblem for that issue, a 
metaphoric description. According to an image originally introduced by Otto Neurath, 
science and empirical knowledge are like a boat: “We are at sea, and we must repair 
the boat while we are underway without ever being able to put into dry-dock”. As 
Terry Pinkard observes at the end of the last century: This image has “become the 
metaphor of choice” for Anglo American mainstream philosophy. (Pinkard 1999: 191). 
It appears, for example, in Quine (1970: 3), Davidson (2009b: 169) or McDowell 
(1996: 81). The image is a perfect expression of the post-analytic antifoundationalist 
spirit, the point, as McDowell formulates it, “that one can relect only from the midst 
of the way of thinking one is relecting about” (1996: 81). There is no outward haven 
to which one can retreat and carefully rebuild one’s knowledge from scratch. 
And yet the famous image of the boat, so essential for the post-analytic self-
understanding, had been introduced by one of the leading members of the Vienna 
Circle, by Otto Neurath, long before the rise of post-analytic philosophy (1921: 75 ff.; 
see Uebel 2000). Neurath himself points us even further back to history: He 
substantiates his antifoundationalism with reference to the conventionalism of Henri 
Poincaré and Pierre Duhem, philosophers (and practitioners) of science at the end of 
the 19th century (Neurath 1921: 81). A more contemporary appropriation of that theme, 
in turn, calls it a genuine “pragmatist thought”, thus adding yet another instance of 
antifoundationalism: “We must try to explain our practices and concepts, including 
our epistemic norms and standards, using those very practices, concepts, norms, and 
standards” (Misak 2013: 252). 
Our little survey shows that this thought is indeed at the core of much of modern 
philosophy; but it is not essentially tied to any philosophical school or doctrine. It 
seems that Neurath’s antifoundationalist idea is neither speciically pragmatist, 
post-analytic or bound to a strong linguistically oriented type of thinking. It is the 
expression of something much more general, to which we turn in the next section.
9. Peter Godfrey-Smith (2003: 32) lists references to holistic doctrines in Feigl, Carnap and “even”  Ayer. 
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3. The Two Pillars of Antifoundationalism 
We have seen that antifoundationalism is not exclusively bound to linguistic 
philosophy. It can also be found in other philosophical lavors, as our little history of 
analytic philosophy has shown. It is time now to broaden the perspective. If we take 
modernity to begin with the rise of the empirical sciences, antifoundationalism seems 
to be a typically modern way of thinking: a reaction to the impressive performance 
of modern forms of inquiry. In fact, it turns out to be a philosophical attitude which is 
tightly tied to the rise of the sciences, though by no means subjecting itself to them. 
Antifoundationalism, I want to claim, embodies two modern attitudes which have 
the tendency to pull in different directions: There is, irst, a strong respect and a high 
esteem for modern science, where “science” is understood as a partially empirical 
form of research going beyond mere mathematical or logical reasoning. Secondly, 
there is an equally strong appreciation of human reason and its self-critical powers. 
We can call these the twin values of empirical science and critical rationality. Taken 
together, they highlight the revolutionary force of scientiic enlightenment, which 
demands that even long established and cherished beliefs have to be toppled if, upon 
empirical inspection, they turn out to be wrong.
On a irst glance, there seems to be no problem holding both values at the same 
time: Isn’t science so powerful just because it is rational? Where is the tension? 
If anything can be called “rational”, it seems, it is science – with its strict logical and 
empirical demands on thinking. But not to see that there is a tension, I want to claim, 
is exactly the mistake of the analytic approach to antifoundationalism. 
Let us begin to articulate the tension by elaborating upon the core ideas behind 
these twin values. The irst one is the conviction that science is the paradigmatic form 
of inquiry. Note that this speciic view, even if it is looking obvious to us, already has 
an historical index. Since Plato, philosophers had always wanted to avoid building our 
hopes on dreams or idle fantasies. Good knowledge must be well-founded. That’s no 
news, and it is in no way restricted to philosophy. But the rise of modern science has 
opened up a new option: in addition to the traditional recourse to eternal, logical or 
mathematical truths, such a solid justiication can now also be sought in experience 
or empirical evidence. 
Such a strong conidence in science is a common article of modern faith. There is 
a widespread respect for the accomplishments of science in modern philosophy, and 
numerous thinkers have been inspired to ind out what has caused this success, and 
whether we can transfer it to other forms of inquiry. Thus, we should not only add 
empiricist and positivist philosophers to the long list of “defenders of experience”. 
Valid candidates are also, in particular, Kant (who calls experience “the teacher 
ittingly assigned to us”, CpR B 49810) and his subsequent critics in the tradition of 
German Idealism. As Pinkard (1999) reminds us, these thinkers all sought to keep 
philosophical thinking in touch with the sciences.
10. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1998) will be cited as “CpR“ with “B“ signifying the second 
original German edition. All page numberings are from that edition.
Jörg voLbers Language or experience? – tHat’s not tHe Question
ISSN: 2036-4091               2014, VI, 2
185
Kant’s way of seeing the issue expresses the deeper problem at stake here. He 
gives modern antifoundationalism its distinctive form by laying stress on its second 
core value, rationality. Even though Kant is convinced that experience is our teacher, 
he refrains from passing all authority to it. To the contrary: His whole philosophy 
articulates an understanding of criticism and relection which highlights the ability 
of reason to critically scrutinize any part of itself at any time, thereby establishing a 
radically self-referential realm. To Kant, the deining aspect of human rationality is 
its autonomy. This understanding of reason – which owes quite a lot to Descartes – 
furnishes antifoundationalism with its decisive motivation: Being rational essentially 
means to be fully capable of self-criticism and self-relection; and thus the idea of 
a fully self-authorizing epistemic experience would ly in the face of reason. The 
problem with the given, then, is that it breaks the chain of justiications and thus 
prevents relection to come full circle. Another way to articulate that critical insight 
is that philosophy, and thinking in general, cannot hope to ind a fully external 
justiication of its thoughts. We are always implicated in our own judgments. This 
is the point of Kant’s dictum that the “I think” must be able to accompany all my 
representations11. William James has found his own now-famous expression for that 
insight: “The trail of the human serpent is thus over everything” (1987: 515).
The most visible expressions of Kant’s strong conception of reason can be found in 
his practical philosophy. This is no accident: The deeper issue at stake here is human 
freedom. Kant is convinced that the enlightened mind is capable of freeing itself from 
any subjection to “external”, heteronomous laws and principles. His ethics irmly 
opposes the idea that morality might be founded on emotions or intuitive insights 
(even though it was the same Kant who introduced the idea of a founding fact of 
reason). In religious matters, Kant demanded to accept religion only within the limits 
set by reason; he accepts the Christian commandments only insofar they comply with 
the categorical imperative. In political matters, he defended the necessity to think for 
oneself as the “motto” of the enlightenment: Sapere aude!. The enlightened citizen 
has to free himself from his or her “self-incurred tutelage” A12. What is necessary for 
that change is, according to Kant, the competent exercise of one’s own understanding.
Kant’s political motto can be transferred to his theoretical philosophy: Dare 
to think yourself, and you will be able to inally free yourself from bad, dogmatic 
metaphysics (which is also “self-incurred”, since reason itself misunderstands its 
very own possibilities). The most tangible epistemological expression of this strong 
conception of autonomy is Kant’s often-cited statement that concepts and experience 
are dependent on each other: “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions 
without concepts are blind” (CpR: B75)13. Here we touch upon the tight connection 
between Kant’s strong trust in human reason and the antifoundationalist criticism 
of empiricism. Everything “given” (in Sellars’ sense) in experience would coerce us 
11. Taylor 2013 offers such a reading of Kant’s transcendental deduction. 
12. I am referring here to the irst sentence of Kant’s answer to the question “What is Enlightenment?“ 
(Kant 1999: 20-28; see Volbers 2011). 
13. Kant actually talks about “intuitions” (“Anschauungen”) remaining blind; but this is a technical term 
adding the speciic thesis that experience is always already “formed” in order to be intelligible at all.
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into an immutable judgment, and thus undermine and eventually destroy autonomous 
thinking. We want external friction through empirical evidence and experience; but 
we also need to guard the critical capacity of reason. The rejection of the empirical 
given is an integral part of the overall strategy to defend reason’s autonomy.
4. Antifoundationalism and Transcendental Philosophy 
Kant’s position had a decisive inluence on the subsequent course of philosophy. 
Terry Pinkard (1999) maps out a whole history of modern philosophy, continental 
and analytic, which is centered on the strong understanding of autonomy and 
rationality defended by German Idealism, and its continuous critique. But the point 
is not historical. Kant’s strong understanding of autonomy exempliies an essential 
problem of modernity: How can and should we understand “reason” in the light of the 
success of modern, empirical sciences? On the one hand, we want to let ourselves be 
corrected by experience. Yet there is a limit to its authority: we better also be wary of 
its immediate suggestions. This is not criticism for its own sake, but rather a necessary 
note of caution. Science is not just “picking up” experience’s lessons, as it were. It has 
to learn how to take them: what to accept and what to decline. 
Kant devised an inluential strategy to defend the antifoundationalist ideal that 
we can relectively correct all of our judgments (even if never “all at once”). He 
tried to demonstrate that all experience is always already “infused” with rationality 
and understanding, thus ready to be accessed through reasoning. This transcendental 
approach to experience expresses a powerful way to unite the two fundamental 
premises of antifoundationalism: The critical power of reason can be combined with 
empiricism if we rationalize “experience”. Kant’s proposal is to see experience as a 
series of judgments, and thus to integrate all experience into a complex of categorical 
and conceptual presumptions. Such a rationalization allows us to confer the power 
of justiication to the “given” experience and yet to leave open the possibility of 
retrospective criticism. In this way, reason’s autonomy is preserved.
Kant’s insight is that experience has to be left open to rationality if we want to 
retain both antifoundationalist tenets. Experience cannot be an absolutely “alien 
force”, as McDowell (1996: 8) explains. Illustrations of this general transcendental 
point can be found in Hegel’s Phenomenology. In its opening discussion of sense-
certainty we see that the simple gesture of pointing cannot alone produce or constitute 
knowledge, since knowledge – understanding – already assumes a generality which 
transcends the presently given. It is not by accident that Hegel draws on the idea of 
ostensive deinition to discuss the inherent problems of our hold on experience. That 
simple gesture is the incarnated promise of empiricism. It suggests that idle quarreling 
can be cut short by pointing to the facts: “don’t you see?”. And yet, this gesture seems 
to be incapable of determining knowledge. Understanding what is being pointed to 
already presupposes the general capacity to recognize what falls under the concept, 
something which cannot be provided by the singular bare presence of a thing.
The same point is exploited in Wittgenstein’s so-called private language 
argument. The idea of a private language is the thought that there might be something 
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internally “given” to me, independent of any language at all. Obvious candidates 
for such an internally given are mental representations, intentions, and perceptions. 
But how, Wittgenstein asks, can we ever know that we privately refer to the same 
“something”? Without language, Wittgenstein argues, we cannot even know whether 
this “something” is, say, pain, or an impression, or a belief. Lacking the capacity to 
discriminate effectively, it is even dificult to call it a “something”. The efforts to 
describe the “given” without established categories and concepts lead, as Wittgenstein 
sarcastically remarks, to an unintelligible grunt: “So in the end when one is doing 
philosophy one gets to the point where one would like just to emit an inarticulate 
sound” (1967: § 261)14.
I take this “argument from the indispensable background”, as I would like to call 
it, to be the point of philosophies so different as Kant and post-Kantian Idealism, 
but also Wittgenstein, Phenomenology, Hermeneutics and of course Pragmatism. 
They differ in how they articulate the background – it can be purely transcendental, 
or subjective and mental, or linguistic and collective. They also differ in how far 
they advance antifoundationalism15. The decisive factor is that they all oppose the 
“mythical” idea that experience acts as an unjustiied justiier, as a grounding given 
which would bypass the self-critical relexivity of reason. 
If this reconstruction is right, then we can see that the two basic motives of 
antifoundationalism are not of equal weight. Here we come back to the tension 
introduced in the previous section. The irst, scientiic element of antifoundationalism 
tries to isolate science as an outstanding form of inquiry. It attributes science’s success 
to some characteristic trait which will distinguish science from other forms of relection. 
Good candidates are here, for example, mathematical analysis, formal reasoning or 
the experimental method. But the second pillar of antifoundationalism, the criterion 
of rationality, is perfectly general. It applies to all forms of understanding and is not 
restricted to science in any way. In consequence, an antifoundationalism which focuses 
on this second dimension will tend to move away from the concrete scientiic practices. 
It will relect on more general questions of understanding, meaning and rationality. 
The tension, then, is simply this: Science is a particular practice, established in 
the course of a long and complex history; whereas theories of meaning, rationality 
and understanding give a general account which ignores science’s concrete form and 
history. The challenge now is to develop an antifoundationalism which presents such 
a general account without ignoring the particularities of science. The tension must not 
be eliminated. What we want is to understand how science can be so impressively 
effective in comparison with other practices of inquiry, and still leave room for the 
antifoundationalist idea that this success cannot be detached from rational criticism 
and relexive scrutiny. 
We can, of course, emancipate our relection from the irst premise and disagree 
with the modern idea that science is something special. Such a position takes critical 
14. The parallel between Wittgenstein’s private-language argument and the critique of the given is 
pointed out by McDowell (1996: 18-23). 
15. Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (1969), for example, argues against the possibility of a transparently 
rational correction of all knowledge.
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rationality to be a general human capacity without any constitutive link to science. 
But even such a position has to explain why certain kinds of knowledge and relection 
– call them “empirical” – have turned out to be so much more effective than other 
ways. It cannot turn its back on the speciic performance of knowledge, as Barry Allen 
(2004) calls it. A modern philosophy which embraces the transcendental standpoint 
and yet does not show any interest in that special performance cannot be called 
antifoundationalism any more – it loses track of any speciic problem of knowledge. 
I will not argue here against such a position. But I think that most philosophers in 
discussion here, from Kant to Logical Empiricism to post-analytic philosophy, were 
still interested in retaining that distinction – with the exception of Rorty, that is. 
For the same reason, we must not conlate these ideas. Scientiic thinking in its 
modern form is more than critical thinking; minimally, it is a very special form of 
criticism. One good indication that there is something special to science is the fact 
that the practice of empirical research and testing (as well, we might even argue, 
the practices of mathematics) had to be discovered. This historical dimension can 
of course be circumvented by telling the old enlightenment narrative that the rise 
of modern science had been delayed, and even retarded, by the irrational forces of 
history and religion. But this story is untenable. It paints a much too partial and one-
sided picture of both enlightenment and other epochs. It also plays in the hands of 
the myth of the given, since it suggests that experience’s lessons have been always 
already out there, and they have just not been heeded. The emergence of ‘human 
reason’ alone, whatever such an isolated capacity is supposed to be, simply is not a 
suficient cause to establish a “rational” preference for empirical sciences. Modern 
science is more than just reason inding itself.
The most convincing argument for an essential tension between the twin values 
of science and rationality, though, comes from the side of rationality. If we reduce 
antifoundationalism to the claim that all criticism is scientiic, we have no tools left 
in order to criticize science’s self-understanding. We scientize thinking. In taking a 
contingently given historical practice to represent the full scope and range of rationality 
per se, such a position gives up antifoundationalism. It collapses into positivism by 
reducing all rationality to what is presently taken to be “scientiic thinking”, the 
result of which is, paradoxically, that the very possibility of scientiic progress is 
denied. Criticism is an essential part of science’s own self-relection. The historical 
dimension of scientiic methods and practices, the fact that sciences critically relect 
on their own paradigms and presuppositions, contributes essentially to the persuasive 
power of antifoundationalism. If we want to defend the possibility of such a historical 
progression, we have to allow for an uneasy tension between science and rationality.
5. Osing Sight of Science 
The preceding sections have revised the received view of antifoundationalism. 
There is a widespread perception, partly due to Rorty’s inluence, that associates 
antifoundationalism with a linguistically oriented style of philosophizing. A closer 
inspection of the history of antifoundationalism and analytic philosophy has shown 
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that this narrative is at least deceptive. In strongly connecting empiricism and 
foundationalism, it creates the false impression that the notion of “experience” stands 
in the way of every decent understanding of antifoundationalism. 
It has been further suggested that the dichotomy between “language” and 
“experience” should be understood as the expression of a deeper polarity within modern 
antifoundationalist thinking. We have identiied two constitutive requirements of 
antifoundationalism: A strong belief in science, on the one hand, and an equally strong 
adherence to the transcendental principle of rationality and critical self-relection, on 
the other hand. According to that scheme, the post-analytic insistence on the ubiquity 
of language and conceptual rationality is actually a variation of the Kantian and post-
Kantian argument for an indispensable background of understanding. Every “given” 
bit of experience is always already linked to us and our language. The crucial point 
is that in determining experience, that background is also providing a structure for 
critical relection. Any antifoundationalist philosophy has to allow for such a critical 
space if it wants to defend the principled revisability of all claims. 
This way of formulating the matter allows us to put the post-analytic critique of 
experience in a different light. We have seen that there is a certain tension between the 
two constitutive elements of antifoundationalist thinking: The faith in science requires 
that we specify what makes science so special; the defense of critical rationality 
forces the antifoundationalist to look beyond science’s particularities. Traditional 
empiricism took “experience” to be science’s distinguishing mark. Consequently, 
the post-analytic criticism of “experience” created an explanatory gap: How can you 
explain what makes science so special, if it is not seen any more as the best way to 
organize “experience”16? 
In attacking experience, post-analytic antifoundationalism was attacking an 
obvious explanation for the speciic effectiveness of science. The problem, then, is to 
ind a substitute candidate for that functional role. A good candidate is the notion of 
objectivity. In scientiic debates, the term stands, as the historians of science Lorraine 
Daston and Peter Galison (1992, and 2007) point out, primarily for that which escapes 
the distorting inluences of subjectivity. They call objectivity an “epistemic virtue”: 
According to their reconstruction, being true to the facts is associated with the 
sometimes life-long task of taking an objective, universal stance towards the world, a 
task permanently threatened by subjective idiosyncrasies and particularities. It is no 
surprise, then, that objectivity has become such a central and recurring topic within 
post-analytic philosophy of language. The notion is treated as an indicator for the 
true encounter with reality. It promises to capture science’s essential ingredient while 
keeping philosophy away from the problems associated with the idea of “experience”. 
If we follow the trajectory suggested by Rorty – from Quine and Sellars to Davidson 
and inally Rorty himself – the vacancy caused by the dismissal of experience had not 
16. Godfrey-Smith (2003: 8-13) distinguishes three general types of answer which have been given to 
the question how science works: Experience, mathematics and social structure. But mathematics and 
social organization do not oppose the basic empiricist belief that only experience provides us with real 
knowledge; they just add further layers of explanation in specifying why the scientiic way to treat 
experience is extra-ordinary. 
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been successfully illed. Philosophy of language shifted more and more towards the 
transcendental side of antifoundationalism, occupying itself with general questions of 
meaning, understanding and rationality. As a result, “science” is seen as just a very 
eficient realization of a general human ability to reason. A perfect expression of this 
post-analytic shift is Sellars’s dictum that “empirical knowledge, like its sophisticated 
extension, science, is rational, not because it has a foundation but because it is a self-
correcting enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy, though not all at once” 
(Sellars 1997: 79). Science and rationality are set on a par. They are treated like 
equivalent expressions of the same universal self-critical capacity, which in turn is 
identiied with rationality as such. 
One of the pivotal igures in that discussion is, again, Rorty. He saw the functional 
link between the notion of “objectivity” and classical empiricism. In his drive 
to sever all connections with the traditional epistemological discourse, he tried to 
avoid even that weak substitute for foundationalism. He completely discarded the 
traditional modern epistemological narrative. In proposing to substitute “objectivity” 
with “solidarity”, he explicitly denied that scientiic practices embody an ultimately 
privileged access to the world. To most fellow antifoundationalists, though, this was 
one move too much. They try to “rehabilitate objectivity”, as McDowell (2000) calls 
it, and insist that there’s more to objectivity than communal agreement. 
I will leave it open whether post-analytic philosophy has any success with the 
rehabilitation of objectivity17. My problem here is that this discussion has drifted 
away from any concrete consideration of science and its practice. Even worse, the 
term “objectivity” is following in the footsteps of empiricism while obliterating its 
empiricist provenance. It is now supposed to do the work which had traditionally been 
delegated to “experience”: to save knowledge from relativism and conventionalism, 
to bind it to reality. But in treating the term in this abstract way, it becomes an empty 
article of faith. A sign that there is a central confusion at work here is the never-ending 
discussion about epistemological skepticism (see Pinkard 1999; Cavell 1979). Against 
the skeptical threat, objectivity is defended as a regulative dimension of all intelligent 
inquiry (Misak 2004), or as an intrinsic feature of conceptual understanding (Davidson 
2009a). It is taken to be a “perspectival form” (Brandom 1994: 600) underlying every 
rational claim, or to express the transcendental point that the “world is embraceable in 
thought” (McDowell 1996: 33)18.
It would be a mistake to call these accounts to “tell the skeptic to get lost” (Davidson 
2009a: 157) wrong. But in focusing exclusively on “objectivity” and general forms 
of understanding, they are merely one-sided. They overgeneralize science’s universal 
aspirations. Cheryl Misak, for example, describes what she understands to be the 
“more objective kind of pragmatism” as one which is “committed to the objective 
dimension of human inquiry – to the fact that those engaged in deliberation and 
investigation take themselves to be aiming at getting things right, avoiding mistakes, 
and improving their beliefs and theories” (2013: 3). Such an engagement, though, is 
17. For a good detailed discussion of the case of Brandom, see Levine 2012. 
18. My reconstruction of post-analytic philosophy owes much to McDowell 1996, without accepting 
his Kantian position which more or less ignores the challenge of the “negativity” of experience.
Jörg voLbers Language or experience? – tHat’s not tHe Question
ISSN: 2036-4091               2014, VI, 2
191
neither ubiquitous nor universal. Rorty is right in pointing out how overly-conined 
the typical epistemological discourse is when it comes to locating the debate about 
objectivity, and correctly asserts that there are many more forms of intelligent inquiry 
than the scientiic one. Take the arts, for example, or philosophy, which both have a 
rather loose relationship to empirical evidence and testing. Or take serious political 
debates, which can deepen our understanding of a subject without exactly settling 
it. All of these human practices aim “at getting things right, avoiding mistakes 
and improving their beliefs” (Misak 2013: 3). Such a perfectionism is of obvious 
signiicance in morality; it is not far to seek in the arts; it is hopefully driving lots of 
debates within philosophy. What is different, though, is that they do not aim at theories, 
or at empirical knowledge. They communicate in different ways, by different means. 
Their claims are not related to reality in the same way that an “objective” assertion or 
theory is, and they are not backed by the same sort of conclusiveness. This variety of 
intelligence forms an indispensable part of the fabric of human life, and by focusing 
solely on ‘”objectivity” and other post-empiricist substitutes for “experience”, such 
variety is willfully excluded.
6. The Experiment as Paradigm for Relection
The problem with much of post-analytic philosophy of language, as well as 
with certain readings of classical pragmatism, is a too narrow understanding of 
antifoundationalism. It is restricted to an idealized (and yet always implicitly 
scientiically biased) account of understanding and meaning. A wider conception 
should rather use science’s success as an opportunity to articulate the different forms 
of contact with experience. The dividing line, then, does not run between the defenders 
of “language” or “‘experience”. It is rather separating authors who treat rationality as 
the hallmark of modern scientiic thinking and those who criticize a too exclusively 
epistemological focus on knowledge and objectivity.
Classical pragmatism establishes such a wider perspective. It shares the post-
analytical skepticism towards a foundationalist empiricism, and it is equally critical of 
the functional role assigned to experience (as a decontextualized “given”) within the 
empiricist and positivist tradition. But instead of dropping the empiricist’s reference 
to experience, it consciously reconstructs it (see Dewey 1982). In the scheme devised 
above: Classical pragmatism retains the idea that there is something special showing 
up in scientiic practices, something that explains its effectiveness. In that respect, the 
traditional empiricist notion of “experience” was a good irst shot. But empiricism 
was wrong to conceive of it as something which mediates between mind and world. 
It succumbed to the traditionally contemplative position towards knowledge in which 
exploring the world consists solely in looking. Rather, “experience” should be seen as 
a relective activity, for which the scientiic experiment provides an apt paradigm19. 
19. Misak has an eye on experimentalism and discusses, for example, the unintuitive pragmatist claim 
that even pure mathematics can be seen as experiments “in diagrammatic contexts” (2013: 42). Allen 
(2004: 52-59) emphasizes that Peirce took the experiment to be a discovery in the practical ield of 
knowledge which previous empiricists had not recognized. Allen’s “Dyonesian Epistemology” (Chapter 
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For classical pragmatism, experimentation is the outstanding trait which helps 
to explain science’s particular effectiveness. “Experimentalism is the cause of the 
victories won by science”, Dewey asserts (1986: 67). The experiment serves as a 
model for the reconstruction of experience. Peirce introduces pragmatism as the 
philosophy of an experimentalist’s mind (1998: 331-345). Dewey publishes Essays in 
Experimental Logic and looks back at the history of pragmatism as a tradition “known 
under the names of Pragmatism, Instrumentalism, Experimentalism” (1984: 3). Among 
the classical igures, William James seems to be the most detached from any concrete 
reference to the experiment. An experimental scientist by training, his writings focus 
more on the existential morals of experimentalism’s fallible logic. We are “living on 
things in posse”, he claims, on “drafts” or “speculative investments” (1987: 1181). 
I take James’s “radical empiricism” to be largely compatible with many points we will 
discuss now; but the following exposition of the experiment draws more on Peirce and 
Dewey than on James. 
Why is the experiment such an apt replacement for the traditional notion of 
experience? First of all: Because it allows us to defend the empiricist intuition that 
in good knowledge, “experience” carries the main burden of work, while at the 
same time allowing us to honor the main tenets of antifoundationalism. If we look 
at the experiment as the fundamental unit of experience, we avoid any reference to 
a mythical given. Scientiic practitioners do not just “have” experiences and then 
relect on them. They rather conduct complex and relected activities, in the course 
of which experience interferes. Seen from the perspective of experimental practice, 
experiences are never isolated “given” cognitions, but rather form a dynamic low 
with both obstacles and reinforcing effects. This is possible because all perception 
within an experimental setting is, to pick up Sellars’s phrase, “fraught with ought”: 
The experiential low is perceived in relation to the experimentalist’s expectations and 
conceptions, giving it signiicance beyond the immediate moment. 
The second reason to turn to the experiment as a paradigm for experiencing is 
that it highlights the active character of experience. It is often stated that experience, 
for pragmatism, is in principle recalcitrant, deiant, obstinate. As Peirce prominently 
puts it: inquiry is the “struggle to attain a state of belief” (1992: 114). But what is 
often overlooked in this description is its positive character. Experience does not 
remain passive; it exerts force upon the experimenter. When Peirce is talking about a 
“struggle”, he is not just pointing to a series of disappointments. Experimentation is 
also positively driven by ideas and hypotheses which remain sensitive to the ensuing 
course of events. 
This active dimension of experience is already discernible in its beginning. The 
experience of doubt which initiates the experiment is not, as it were, without direction. 
Peirce states that in an experiment, there is always a veriiable hypothesis, and the 
experimenter has to entertain “sincere doubt...as to the truth of that hypothesis” 
(1998: 339, emphasis added). Dewey pronounces a similar point when he claims that 
3) also suggests that one cultural condition of experimentalism is a certain material abundance and 
luxury, which made experimental creativity possible by providing the necessary background stability. 
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“a problem must be felt before it can be stated”. A vague impression already contributes 
to the necessary “selection and the weighing of observed facts and their conceptual 
ordering” (2008: 76). The initial doubt of inquiry is not sweeping skepticism, but 
directed distrust. As such, it shows how experience can be more than just a passive 
impression constraining our choices from without. It is fallibly indicating the possible 
relevance of the ensuing inquiry, urging where to look for and what to count as 
evidence. When inquiry begins, the subject is already taken in by experience. Dewey 
is right in insisting that this is a logical condition of experimental conduct, and not 
a contingent psychological fact: there has to be some background condition which 
determines what is relevant and what can be ignored. 
The third signiicant contribution of the experiment to antifoundationalism is that it 
represents a solid paradigm for a strong understanding of rationality. The experiment is 
a controlled setting to cause unforeseen reactions. But since these reactions have been 
caused at will, they can be traced back to their conditions and their guiding principles. 
Peirce calls the experiment “an operation of thought” (1998: 337). What qualiies this 
judgment for Peirce is that thinking is primarily a matter of “self-control”, meaning 
that it is a normative affair: we can exercise good or bad judgments; right or incorrect 
ones. In consequence, we can criticize bad thinking (and action) and strive to better 
our judgments by relecting on their causes. The experiment delimits a sphere within 
which we can actively exercise, train and ideally improve this self-control.
The self-enclosed structure of experimental relexivity mirrors Kant’s autonomy 
of reason, which we have discussed in sec. 4. The experiment is integrating the 
unforeseen consequences into the experimental setting by transforming them to 
known causes (cf. Dewey 1981: 277). This can be seen as a process of eliminating 
the need for an “external” foundation of our understanding. The ideal experiment 
ceases to be experimentation and becomes a fully autonomous, yet empirically 
contentful understanding. The experiment thus represents a cornerstone of modern 
antifoundationalism – with the difference that it conceives reason not as a given 
(transcendental) structure, but as a controlled material20 space in which autonomous 
understanding will establish itself by and by. 
There is a fourth antifoundationalist lesson to be learned by the experiment: 
It is a method which stays away from any substantial ontological or metaphysical 
commitments. Or, at least, this is by all means how the classical pragmatists see it. 
Peirce calls the experimentalist “color-blind” to the deeper ontological meaning of her 
actions. In other words: “nothing that might not result from experiment can have any 
direct bearing upon conduct” (1998: 332). Nothing is hidden, everything is open to 
experimental investigation. If this idea can be defended, we have antifoundationalism 
in the extreme: as a method, the experiment is free to examine anything which purports 
meaning, including its own particular tools and operations. 
This inal aspect contributes in particular to the distinctive shape of experiential 
antifoundationalism. It allows experimentalism to integrate itself relexively 
20. The sign is, of course, above all a material thing. Dewey extends the material dimension to “[p]
endulums, lenses, prisms, yard sticks, and pound weights and multiplication and logarithmic tables” 
(Dewey 1981: 261).
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into the wider historical and philosophical scheme. From the point of view of the 
experiment, the practice of experimentation is, of course, itself a historical discovery. 
By establishing a signiicantly different way to relate to experience sometime in the 
16th  or  17th  century, it launched the unparalleled success of empirical sciences.  It 
represents a new “art of knowledge” (Allen). But this art did not come into being by 
sovereign rational relection, nor does it express a deeper metaphysical commitment. 
It is the reinement of something like a form of proto-experimentation which did not 
yet develop a clear consciousness of its own methods. Once this discovery has been 
made, we can accept its normative lesson – that all meaning and knowledge is an 
“experimental phenomenon” (Peirce) – and constantly reapply it. Even though the 
experiment is a particular practice, it teaches us something about the way we think in 
general. In a very pragmatist spirit, then, the rise of the experiment can be understood 
as an unintended consequence which retrospectively sheds light on what had been 
previously a groping in the dark. 
If we focus on these four aspects of the experiment, we are in a position to sum 
up the particularity of pragmatism’s experiential approach to antifoundationalism. 
It accepts that there is no such thing as an immediately given in experience; and it 
adopts the modern conidence in reason and its critical powers. But it sees reason 
itself, paradigmatically represented by the experimental activity, as being triggered, 
driven and of course checked by experience. Reason, intelligent relection, is not a 
plain actualization of a given human capacity. It is a response to an underdetermined 
situation; a reaction to a lack of orientation. This is what the experiment, as a practice, 
manifests on a small scale. On an historical scale, the same lesson can be drawn from 
the fact that scientiic experimentation had irst to be found and established in order to 
unfold these impressing powers of reasoning.
In that sense, the most succinct deinition of this kind of philosophy is that it conceives 
antifoundationalism as the core of all rational relection. Antifoundationalism, in that 
view, is not a necessary correction to an otherwise stable structure of empirically 
oriented rationality. Rather, for pragmatism antifoundationalism embodies the very 
essence of what it means to relate to experience. “Experience”, James writes, “merely 
as such doesn’t come ticketed and labeled, we have irst to discover what it is” (1987: 
561). This process of discovery is what antifoundationalism is about. For experiential 
pragmatism, the task is to center our self-understanding around that activity to 
understand what is given. Nothing is plainly given, everything has to be worked with 
in order to understand it (Garrison 1995). Dewey gives this attitude a very vivid and 
itting description: “the immediately given is always the dubious; it is always a matter 
for subsequent events to determine, or assign character to. It is a cry for something not 
given, a request addressed to fortune, with the pathos of a plea or the imperiousness 
of a command” (1981: 262).
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7. Conclusion 
We have now come full circle. Our investigation began by embracing 
antifoundationalism as a good and powerful argument against the notion of 
“experience”, so strong that post-analytic philosophy of language aspired to discard 
this term completely. This seemed to endanger experiential pragmatism. But the whole 
situation turned out to be a misunderstanding. The founding igures of pragmatism 
were not only consciously avoiding any “mythical” reference to an experiential given. 
The idea of restricting antifoundationalism to a language-centered philosophy proved 
to be historically and systematically wrong. There are, and there have been, other valid 
forms of antifoundationalist thinking which are not part of philosophy of language. 
Experiential pragmatism is ready to join the antifoundationalist ranks again. 
Going back to Kant, we turned to the roots of modern antifoundationalism, and 
we found a strong belief in empirical science and an equally strong conviction in the 
critical power of rationality. In that perspective, pragmatism turns out to be another 
articulation of modern antifoundationalist thinking. One which, it is claimed, serves 
antifoundationalist ends better than contemporary analytic philosophy of language. In 
taking the experiment as the paradigm for experience, it remains closer to the particular 
historic success of the empirical sciences that gave rise to antifoundationalism in 
the irst place. Pragmatism can explain this success as a consequence of the speciic 
practical form of scientiic inquiry – one that has become synonymous with inquiry 
tout court within pragmatist circles. That practical form is, however, not imposed upon 
the world by a rationally engineering mind. For experiential pragmatism, it is itself a 
product of experience. Pragmatism’s variant of antifoundationalism, thus turns out to 
be relexivity all the way down: It is not only avoiding the epistemological myth of the 
given, but also avoiding any transcendental reiication of our intellectual powers21. 
In concentrating on the organizational form of our intelligent practices, this 
pragmatist approach further allows us to plunge into the wide variety of human practices 
(and experiences). This variety can be explored, as it were, from within. We can leave 
the discussion behind how “world and mind...are transcendentally made for each 
other” (McDowell 1996: 159). From within lived experience, it is possible to discern a 
wide variety of ways to be “minded”. Science, or scientiic thinking, is one of them. It 
is outstanding and, in certain respects, unrivaled; but it is not all there is to rationality 
and experience. In keeping an eye on these differences, experiential pragmatism seems 
to be better guarded against the danger of an uncritical and unrelective thinking which 
confuses a scientiic ideal of rationality and criticism with its very essence. 
Looking at antifoundationalism in that perspective, then, allows us to offer yet 
another re-description of its motivation. Modern science has challenged and perhaps 
at times even threatened our self-understanding as rational being. It has shown that it 
is not thinking alone which helps us to come to grips with the world. (That is, if we 
take thinking to be a someway non-empirical affair). This challenge is not exclusively 
21. This historical description is better suited to Dewey’s philosophy than to Peirce or James, but I take 
it to be the overall perspective which allows to grasp the essence of experiential pragmatism.
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modern. In a way, we can already draw a similar line between Plato, the idealist, 
and Aristotle, the empiricist. But it is distinctively modern in that it forces us to take 
thinking, rationality and understanding to be essentially interwoven with the world. 
This is actually also the lesson of the late-twentieth century post-analytic philosophy 
which tried to shake off skeptical worries about an imperfect access to reality 
(Davidson, Brandom and McDowell). But it is better articulated in an experiential 
antifoundationalism. This view takes the critical power of reasoning not to be identical 
with “rationality” as such, but sees it rather as an historical practical accomplishment 
which has to be appropriated, defended and re-established over and over again22. 
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